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INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW IN CENTRAL ASIA:
COMMITMENTS, COMPLIANCE AND BEYOND
DINARA ZIGANSHINA1
INTRODUCTION
Ensuring the fair and effective management of trans-
boundary water resources is one of the most pressing
contemporary challenges. As a recent UN Millennium
Development Goals Report indicates, more than 1.2
billion people in the world live under conditions of
physical water scarcity, and another 1.6 billion people
live in areas of economic/political water scarcity, where
human, institutional and financial issues limit access to
water.2 Since the world's 263 international river basins
are home to almost half the global population, most
states rely heavily on transboundary watercourses for
at least some of their water, and the rest import goods
`virtual water' from shared river basins. The impact of
climate change on transboundary waters is increasing
the level of uncertainty and risk, so the need for
effective management is becoming more urgent.3 The
2009 UNECE Guidance states: .` . . in addition to the
uncertainty over climate change impacts, countries are
faced with uncertainty about their neighbours' reac-
tions'.4 Critical freshwater ecosystems are also under
increasing stress.5 Despite these common problems,
transboundary water management is context-specific.
Differences in the characteristics and uses of the
watercourse, geopolitical factors, socio-economic con-
ditions and so on mean that each transboundary river
basin has its own issues and peculiarities.
Taking Central Asia as its focus, this article discusses
context-specific contemporary transboundary water
issues and analyses the role of international law in
addressing such issues. Five post-Soviet countries of
Central Asia ± Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ± reappeared
on the international scene in the early 1990s. These
countries needed to find an effective and peaceful way
to regulate the freshwater resources that cross their
borders. The region's water-related problems include
water allocation controversies, competition between
irrigation and hydropower, water quality deterioration,
environmental degradation, loss of species and bio-
diversity and climate change.6 Over the past two
decades, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have
entered into a variety of sub-regional, regional and
global water-related agreements and reaffirmed their
adherence to the principles of international water law.
Despite these legal developments, the countries
appear to disregard some of their commitments, with
an adverse effect on regional relations and the
environment. As Zaelke, Stilwell and Young rightly
point out: `[w]ithout compliance, the rule of law has no
meaning' and `social stability and legal certainty' are at
risk.7 Compliance with treaty commitments is there-
fore crucial when assessing the role played by
international water law in ensuring regional security
and sustainable development in Central Asia. The
scholarly literature is growing and there are numerous
practical guidelines on the issue of compliance with
international legal commitments, especially in the
environmental field and under the umbrella of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE).8 This article examines whether the current
compliance discourse can assist with the peaceful
management of transboundary waters in Central Asia
and also questions its limits and sufficiency.
A brief overview of transboundary water problems in
the Aral Sea basin of Central Asia is followed by
identification of treaty law applicable to the basin's
6 I Severskiy and others Global International Waters Assessment Aral
Sea, GIWA Regional Assessment 24 (University of Kalmar on behalf of
UNEP Kalmar 2005).
7 D Zaelke, M Stilwell and O R Young `What Reason Demands:
Making Law Work for Sustainable Development' in D Zaelke, D Kaniaru
and E KruzÏõÂkovaÂ (eds) Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance
and Sustainable Development (Cameron May London 2005).
8 See eg A Chayes and A H Chayes The New Sovereignty: Com-
pliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University
Press Cambridge 1995); E B Weiss and H Jacobson (eds) Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmen-
tal Accords (MIT Press Cambridge 1998); D Victor, K Raustiala and E
Skolnikoff (eds) The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Commitments (MIT Press Cambridge 1998); U Beyerlin,
P-T Stoll and R Wolfrum (eds) Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and
Academia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden/Boston 2006). See also
`Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements' Doc UNEP(DEPI)/MEAs/WG1/3 Annex II;
`Guidelines for Strengthening Compliance with and Implementation
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in the ECE Region' Doc ECE/
CEP/107.
1 The author would like to thank Patricia Wouters, Alistair Rieu-
Clarke, and the editors of this journal for their valuable comments and
suggestions on drafts of this article. Contact email: z.dinara@mail.ru.
2 United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA) The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008 (UN DESA
New York 2008) at 40.
3 B C Bates and others (eds) Climate Change and Water. Technical
Paper of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
Secretariat Geneva 2008).
4 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) `Guidance on Water
and Adaptation to Climate Change to Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes' UN
Doc ECE/MPWAT/30 2009 (UNECE Geneva 2009) www.unece.org/env/
documents/2009/Wat/mp_wat/ECE_MP.WAT_30_E.pdf (5 March 2010).
5 See Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystems and Human
Well-Being: Wetlands and Water (World Resources Institute Washing-
ton DC 2005). See also H Tremblay `An Analytical Framework for Legal
Regimes Applicable to Freshwater Ecosystems' pp 152±64.
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shared waters. Using the UNECE Geneva Strategy,9 a
framework is set out to analyse whether existing water-
related treaties at the sub-regional, regional and global
levels contain the essential elements for a successful
compliance arrangement, such as baseline provisions,
compliance review procedure and an institutional
mechanism. This framework is then examined to
ascertain the main substantive and procedural rules
of the relevant treaties and their compliance provi-
sions. Finally, critical studies on compliance are
reviewed in an attempt to understand more fully the
role of international water law in Central Asia.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER ISSUES IN
CENTRAL ASIA
The Aral Sea and its two main tributaries, the Amudarya
and the Syrdarya, are the core of the Central Asian
water network. The Amudarya is the biggest Central
Asian river in terms of annual water runoff (79.4 km3/
year). It originates in Tajikistan (where 74 per cent of
flow is formed), the Kyrgyz Republic (2 per cent),
Afghanistan and Iran (13.9 per cent),10 then forms the
border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (8.5 per
cent), crosses the territory of Turkmenistan (1.7 per cent)
and returns to Uzbekistan where it discharges into the
Aral Sea. It is 2540 km long from the headwaters of the
Pyandzh, its main tributary, to the Aral Sea and has a
catchment area of 309,000 km2. About 75.2 per cent of
the Syrdarya run-off originates in the Kyrgyz Republic.
The Syrdarya then flows across Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
and discharges into the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. About
15.2 per cent of the flow of the Syrdarya is formed in
Uzbekistan, about 6.9 per cent in Kazakhstan, and about
2.7 per cent in Tajikistan. The Syrdarya is up to 3019 km
long from its main tributary, the Naryn headwaters, to
the Aral Sea and has a catchment area of 219,000 km2.11
The social and economic development of the CARs
depends on the waters of these two rivers and there
are many competing claims over the use of their
waters for irrigation, hydropower, and the environ-
ment.12 The uneven distribution of energy resources in
the region,13 resulting from the close connection
between the water and energy networks, is an added
complication.
When these countries were part of the Soviet Union,
water and energy resources were managed regionally
via a system of reservoirs and hydropower stations
established along both rivers. Landscape and climatic
conditions meant that reservoirs for water storage
were built in the upstream countries (the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan) and used for irrigation in the
downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan). The system was operated primarily for
irrigation. Power generation was secondary and fossil
fuel was used to compensate for electricity deficits in
the upstream countries.14
When the Soviet Union was dissolved, it soon became
apparent that the emerging new geopolitics and
market-oriented economies of the CARs undermined
the economic basis upon which the former Soviet
management scheme was designed.15 Competing
interests between upstream and downstream users
and the insecurity of the water-energy trade-off
resulted in the individual republics focusing on
achieving national self-sufficiency in both energy and
food.16 The upstream countries declared their interests
in hydroelectricity and changed the use of reservoirs
from irrigation to hydropower production, although
the downstream countries still relied heavily on
irrigated agriculture. This shift was especially notice-
able in the Syrdarya river basin where switching the
operation of the Toktogul reservoir from irrigation to
electricity production resulted in a substantial change
in flow patterns, with the peak of water releases in
winter rather in summer.17
To expand their capacity for electricity generation, the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are planning to build a
number of large new hydropower projects on the
region's transboundary rivers.18 In addition to meeting
domestic demand, these plans could turn both coun-
tries into large-scale exporters of electricity to China,
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and possibly other coun-
tries.19 Such a level of hydropower development might
9 UNECE Geneva Strategy and Framework for Monitoring Compliance
with Agreements on Transboundary Waters (UNECE Geneva Strategy).
UNECE and UNEP Network of Expert on Public Participation and
Compliance `Water Management: Guidance on Public Participation and
Compliance with Agreements' UN Doc MPWAT/2000/5 (17 December
1999) (UNECE Geneva 2000) www.unece.org/env/water/publications/
documents/guidance.pdf (10 March 2010).
10 Estimates on Afghanistan's contribution to the Amudarya flow
vary. See V Dukhovny and V Sokolov Assessment of Water Resources
in Northern Afghanistan, its Use and Impact to Region of the
Amudarya River Basin (SIC ICWC Tashkent 2002). This article does
not address the relationships of the CARs with Afghanistan.
11 For more information visit http://cawater-info.net/aral/water_e.htm
(21 January 2010).
12 UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States Central Asian Human Development Report Bring-
ing Down Barriers: Regional Cooperation for Human Development and
Human Security (UNDP Bratislava 2005).
13 Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are rich in hydro-
carbon, whereas the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan possess a massive
and largely underdeveloped hydropower potential.
14 V Dukhovny and V Sokolov Lessons on Cooperation Building to
Manage Water Conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin (UNESCO-IHP Paris 2003).
15 ibid.
16 See eg J Granit and others Regional Water Intelligence Report
Central Asia (Stockholm International Water Institute Stockholm 2010).
17 V Dukhovny `Case Study of the Syrdarya River 2002±2008' 21 IWRA
Update Newsletter of the International Water Resources Association;
World Bank Water Energy Nexus, Improving Regional Cooperation in
the Syr-Darya Basin (World Bank Washington DC 2004).
18 Including a number of large power projects started during the
Soviet era and suspended for lack of funds after considerable costs had
been incurred. Examples of hydropower projects include Sangtuda-1
and Sangtuda-2, Rogun and Dashtidjumn. Sangtuda HEP-1 (670 MW,
2700 GWh) is the first step of the Sangtuda Water Power Development
Vakhsh cascade http://minenergo.tj/davomash_en/sangtuda1_en.html;
Sangtuda-2 HEP (220 MW 990 GWh) is the second step of the Sangtuda
Water Power Development located between Baypaza and Golovnaya
HPP of Vakhsh cascade http://minenergo.tj/davomash_en/sangtuda2_
en.html; Rogun HEP (3600 MW 13,000 GWh) is the largest on the
Vakhsh River http://minenergo.tj/davomash_en/rogun_en.html; Dash-
tidjumn HEP (4000 MW 15,600 kWh) is a hydro site straddling the Tajik
Afghan border on the Pyandzh river http://minenergo.tj/davomash_en/
dashtijumges_en.html (21 January 2010).
19 World Bank Central Asia Regional Electricity Exports Potential
Study. Europe and Central Asia Region (Washington DC 2004); Energy
Charter Secretariat `Regional Electricity Cooperation in Central and
Southern Asia: Opportunities for Increased Regional Trade and the
Role of the Energy Charter Treaty' Occasional Papers No 3 (Brussels
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also provide significant benefits to the region as a
whole in terms of meeting regional electricity de-
mand20 and mitigating the consequences of extreme
water-related events as a result of climate change.21
However, these developments are problematic for the
downstream countries. Uzbekistan argues that the
uncoordinated and unilateral actions of building dams
upstream might aggravate the impact of climate
change, as well as adversely effecting the regional
environment and the downstream population depen-
dent upon water for food production and `vital human
needs'.22 The debate on building new dams is a hot
topic for the Amudarya river basin where Tajikistan has
mobilised the whole population to build the Rogun
hydropower plant,23 although Uzbekistan questions
the legality and ecological safety of the project.24
Apart from issues related to food and energy security,
environmental concerns are vitally important when
taking the region's legacy and new economic devel-
opments into consideration.25 During the Soviet era,
regulation of natural resources was largely based on
economics so that extensive cotton production could
be fully exploited, and little attention was paid to en-
vironmental protection. One of the most telling ex-
amples of this is the devastating degradation of the
Aral Sea, its ecosystem, and surrounding areas as a
result of massive water diversions for irrigated agri-
culture started in the 1960s. The Aral Sea, once the
world's fourth-largest lake, today consists only of a
series of separate bodies of water surrounded by a
vast saline desert.26 Since the CARs became indepen-
dent, many positive initiatives have been implemented
and regional attitudes towards protecting the en-
vironment have gradually been changing.27 However,
new environmental concerns seem to arise, including
the expansion of the Aidar-Arnasai Lake in Uzbeki-
stan28 and the construction of the `Golden Lake' ± a
large artificial lake in the Kara-Kum desert ± in
Turkmenistan.29
This overview of water-related problems in Central
Asia is not intended to be comprehensive but to give
the reader a sense of the complexity of the issues
currently faced by the region's decision-makers. These
issues must be considered within the wider context of
the political, economic and social changes that have
taken place over the past decades, as well as the
impacts of climate change, population growth, globa-
lisation and geopolitical factors.30
The CARs have recognised the need to address these
problems in a coordinated way at the top political
level,31 and the heads of states have established the
programme of concrete actions to make environmen-
tal and socio-economic improvements to the Aral Sea
basin and attract much-needed investment (Aral Sea
Basin Programme ± ASBP).32 Over the past two
decades, the countries have adopted a number of
sub-regional agreements, established new regional
institutions, and joined regional and global water-
related treaties. A brief overview of these treaties
follows.
2007); S Peyrouse `The Hydroelectric Sector in Central Asia and the
Growing Role of China' (2007) 5 China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly
131±48.
20 ibid.
21 M Fay and others Adapting to Climate Change in Europe and
Central Asia (World Bank Washington DC 2009) p 80 www.worldbank.
org/eca/climate/ECA_CCA_Full_Report.pdf (21 January 2010).
22 See Address by H E Mr Vladimir Norov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Uzbekistan, at the general debate of the 64th
session of the UN General Assembly (New York 28 September 2009)
www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/UZ_en.pdf (21 January 2010);
`Uzbekistan Calls for International Control over Construction of New
Hydropower Plants' Moscow Interfax (2 December 2009); N Koroleva
`Kyrgyz Kambarata HEPs induce `` irreversible negative environmental
effects'' to Uzbekistan' Centrasia in Russian (16 September 2009)
www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1253080740 (21 January 2010).
23 Construction is being financed from the Tajik budget and through
the sale of Rogun plant shares to the population. See eg `Tajikistan
Amnesties Money Spent On Hyrdoplant Shares' Moscow ITAR-TASS in
English (24 February 2010); `German Envoy Warns of Social Impact of
Tajik Power Plant Fund-Raising Campaign' Dushanbe Avesta in Russian
(30 March 2010).
24 Address by President Islam Karimov at the meeting of heads of the
IFAS founding states. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations (28 April 2009) www.un.int/wcm/content/site/
uzbekistan/pid/9548 (10 February 2010). Kazakhstan has recently sup-
ported Uzbekistan's position; J Lillis `Uzbekistan: Nazarbayev Makes
Diplomatic Trade-Off With Karimov' Eurasia Insight (18 March 2010)
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031810_pr.shtml
(19 March 2010).
25 L de Martino and others `Environment and Security: Transforming
Risks into Cooperation ± Central Asia' (UNEP, UNDP, OSCE and NATO
Arendal 2005).
26 V Dukhovny and J de Schutter `History of the Aral Sea: Degrada-
tion of The Aral Sea and South Prearalie' CAWATERInfo http://www.
cawater-info.net/aral/aral3_e.htm (10 March 2010).
27 de Martino `Environment and Security' (n 25).
28 G Glysin `From Aral to Arnasai' in Ecological Almanac `Simply
Writing on Environment' (in Russian 2005) http://kungrad.com/aral/
book/arnasai/ (21 January 2010): `Due to low carrying capacity of the
Syrdarya river Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were faced with threat of
their lowlands inundation and were forced to divert wastefully water
into Arnasai depression. As one of the impacts, an artificial Arnasai
lake was expanded and surrounding hydrophilous vegetation area was
inundated that led inter alia to decreasing self-purification capacity of
the lake, disrupting food supply of herbivorous fish, and reducing
wildlife population.'
29 `Turkmen `` Golden Lake'' May Prove Green Disaster' Times of
Central Asia (24 August 2009) www.cawater-info.net/news/08-2009/24_e.
htm (15 February 2010); also `Turkmen President Explains Regional
Importance of Artificial Lake in Karakum Desert' Turkmenistan.Ru (19
March 2010) http://turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=en&elem_id=
16577&type=event&sort=date_desc (23 March 2010).
30 K M Campbell and others The Age of Consequences: The Foreign
Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change
(Center for Strategic and International Studies and Center for a New
American Security Washington DC 2007) http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf (20 April 2010) p 67: `coun-
tries in Central Asia and the Caucasus will become more strategically
important because they can offer energy supplies and routing
alternatives to the Middle East and Russia'.
31 Nukus Declaration (20 September 1995); Almaty Declaration (28
February 1997); Ashgabat Declaration (9 April 1999); Dushanbe
Declaration (6 October 2002); Almaty Joint Statement by the Heads
of Founder-States of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (28
April 2009) http://cawater-info.net/library/declar_e.htm (21 January
2010).
32 In 1994 the heads of CARs decided to adopt the Programme of
concrete actions for environmental improvement in the Aral Sea basin
over the next 3±5 years (ASBP-1) and to approve the main provisions of
the strategy for addressing problems of Aral, Priaralie and the Aral Sea
basin in light of regional socio-economic development. In 2002 they
approved the Programme of concrete actions on environmental and
socio-economic improvement in the Aral Sea basin for 2003±2010
(ASBP-2). In 2009 they mandated relevant agencies to develop ASBP-3
(Almaty Joint Statement n 31).
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TREATIES APPLICABLE TO TRANSBOUNDARY
WATERS OF THE ARAL SEA BASIN
Sub-regional treaties
The legal architecture of sub-regional transboundary
water cooperation in Central Asia is based upon basin-
wide, watercourse-specific and bilateral treaties. An
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Joint
Management of the Use and Conservation of Water
Resources of Interstate Sources33 (1992 Almaty Agree-
ment) was one of the first treaties concluded by the
CARs after they declared independence, demonstrat-
ing the high priority given to water issues in the region
and illustrating the deployment of international law as
a tool to deal with the new situation. The 1992 Almaty
Agreement recognises regional water resources as
`common and integral'34 and serves as a foundation
instrument agreed by all CARs to manage shared
waters at a basin level. It reaffirms the Soviet manage-
ment status quo over shared international waters
across Central Asia, primarily the two main rivers of
the Aral Sea basin ± the Amudarya and the Syrdarya.35
In 1993, the CARs entered into an Agreement on Joint
Actions for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis (1993 Kzyl-
Orda Agreement),36 which defined a range of `com-
mon objectives' to be pursued to mitigate the crisis.37
In 1996, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan came to a bi-
lateral agreement on water management issues, in-
cluding water allocation in the Amudarya's lower
reaches.38 There is still no watercourse-specific agree-
ment on the Amudarya river basin which covers the
whole basin and involves all riparian countries,
including Afghanistan. In the same year, Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan agreed to foster
economic cooperation between countries on the use
of fuel and water resources, construction and opera-
tion of gas pipelines, mostly touching the Syrdarya
river basin.39 As one of the measures, the 1996
agreement asserts the need for a cooperative pro-
gramme that links `economically reasonable supplies'
of fuel resources and electricity to `the most effective
use of hydro-resources of the Syrdarya river basin for
irrigation.'40
In 1998, three countries concluded a watercourse-
specific agreement on the use of the water and energy
resources of the Syrdarya river basin with the aim of
producing a cooperative framework.41 Tajikistan joined
the agreement in 1999. The document stipulates a
general scheme for water and energy trade-off42 and
makes reservoir operation modes, electricity and fuel
interchange subject to annual intergovernmental
agreements.43 In the context of the link between water
and energy, the 1999 agreement on parallel operation
of the energy systems of Central Asian states is of
special interest.44 This agreement appears to foster
more effective operation of the energy system with the
aim of establishing an `integral market for electricity' in
the region.45 However, Turkmenistan in 2003 and
Uzbekistan more recently have both left this energy
network, affecting all the countries in the region to a
varying degree.46
Finally, a review of sub-regional water-related instru-
ments would be incomplete without the 1998 agree-
ment between Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and
Uzbekistan that regulates wider environmental issues
by stipulating the areas of cooperation in the use and
protection of natural resources.47
33 Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic
of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management of the
Use and Conservation of Water Resources of Interstate Sources
(Almaty 18 February 1992) (1992 Almaty Agreement) an unofficial
English translation can be found at http://cawater-info.net/library/eng/l/
ca_cooperation.pdf (5 February 2010).
34 ibid Preamble.
35 The 1992 Almaty Agreement (n 33) reaffirmed that the `pattern and
principles of water allocation' in the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers
shall be based on criteria and volumes established in the Soviet era in
`The Schemes of Complex Water Resources Use and Protection'. See
Resolution of the Expert Sub-Commission to the Gosplan (State
Planning Committee) State Expert Commission of the USSR (12 March
1982); Protocol of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry
of Water Resources Management of the USSR on Approval of the
Principles of Inter-Republican Water Allocation of the Syrdarya River
Basin Resources No 413 (29 February 1984); Protocol of the Scientific
and Technical Council of the Ministry of Water Resources Manage-
ment of the USSR on Approval of the Principles of Inter-Republican
Water Allocation of the Amudarya River Basin Resources No 556
(10 September 1987); Decision of the Gosplan State Expert Commis-
sion of the USSR No 11 (5 March 1982).
36 Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic
of Uzbekistan on Joint Actions for Addressing the Problems of the Aral
Sea and its Coastal Area, Improving the Environment, and Ensuring the
Social and Economic Development of the Aral Sea Region (Kzyl-Orda
26 March 1993) (1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement) an unofficial English
translation can be found at www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/l/kzyl-
orda_agreement.pdf (7 February 2010).
37 ibid art 1.
38 Agreement between Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan on Cooperation over Water Management Issues (Chardjev 16 Jan-
uary 1996) (1996 Chardjev Agreement) an unofficial English translation
can be found at http://www.cawater-info.net/library/rus/uzb_tur_1.pdf
(7 February 2010).
39 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Fuel and Water Resources,
Construction and Operation of Gas Pipelines in Central Asian Region
(Tashkent 5 April 1996).
40 ibid art 1.
41 Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on
the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syrdarya Basin (Bishkek
17 March 1998) (Republic of Tajikistan joined in 1999) (1998 Syrdarya
Agreement) an unofficial English translation can be found at cawater-
info.net/library/eng/l/syrdarya_water_energy.pdf (3 February 2010).
42 ibid art 4.
43 ibid art 8.
44 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Government of the
Republic of Tajikistan and the Government of the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan on the Parallel Operation of the Energy Systems of Central Asian
States (Bishkek 17 June 1999) an unofficial English translation can be
found at http://www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/l/parallel-agreement.
pdf (7 February 2010).
45 ibid art 1.
46 E Marat `Uzbekistan Announces its Withdrawal from Central Asian
Power Grid' 6 (222) Eurasia Daily Monitor (3 December 2009).
47 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of
the Republic of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Area of Environ-
ment and Rational Nature Use, (Bishkek 17 March 1998) (1998 Environ-
mental Cooperation Agreement) an unofficial English translation can
be found at http://www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/l/nature_use.pdf
(7 February 2010).
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Regional and global treaties
In addition to the sub-regional treaties, the CARs have
joined a broad range of regional and global water-
related instruments.
At a regional level, under the auspices of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS), Belarus, the
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have
signed an agreement on the main principles of in-
teractions in the field of rational use and protection
of the transboundary watercourses of the CIS (1998
Moscow Agreement).48 This agreement refers to the
1966 Helsinki Rules49 and the UNECE Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention)50
and is substantially grounded on the latter's provi-
sions. Among the CARs only Tajikistan is a party to the
1998 Moscow Agreement. Kazakhstan has signed the
treaty, although it has not ratified it yet, with a reser-
vation that interactions in the field of rational use and
protection of transboundary watercourses shall be a
subject of separate agreements between parties con-
cerned.51 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan became a party to
the UNECE Water Convention in 2001. In 2007,
Uzbekistan also joined this regional treaty. Since the
1998 Moscow Agreement is largely based on the
provisions of the UNECE Water Convention, at least
three countries appear to share similar commitments
at a regional as well as sub-regional level. It could be
argued that, since many provisions of the UNECE
Water Convention are the customary norms of inter-
national water law,52 the convention provides a strong
cooperative framework for all Central Asian countries
to manage their shared waters equitably and reason-
ably. This sentiment is further supported by Libert who
states that `the relevance and authority of the Con-
vention is recognised by all Central Asian countries
and also those which have not ratified the Convention
are actively participating in the activities in its pro-
gramme of work'.53
Other UNECE conventions are also relevant to trans-
boundary water resources management issues. Kazakh-
stan and the Kyrgyz Republic acceded to the Conven-
tion on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context,54 which obliges parties to notify
and consult each other on all major projects likely to
have a significant adverse environmental impact across
borders. The Convention on the Transboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents,55 to which Kazakhstan is a
party, is designed to protect people and the environ-
ment against industrial accidents. Finally, Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are
all parties to the Aarhus Convention.56
At a global level, in 2007 Uzbekistan became a party to
the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses
Convention).57 This global instrument ± although not
yet in force ± has already had a positive impact on the
international legal environment through the process
of codification and crystallisation of the customary
rules of international water law.58
All five states are also parties to other global treaties
which are important in the transboundary water con-
text, including the Convention on Wetlands of Inter-
national Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
(Ramsar Convention)59 which provides a cooperative
framework for the conservation of wetland habitats; the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention on Bio-
diversity)60 which pursues the conservation of biolo-
gical diversity, the sustainable use of its components,
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits aris-
ing out of the utilisation of genetic resources; the UN
Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries
48 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus,
the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Republic of
Tajikistan on the Main Principles of Interactions in the Field of Rational
Use and Protection of the Transboundary Watercourses of the CIS
(Moscow 11 September 1998) (entered into force for Belarus, Russian
Federation and Tajikistan 6 June 2002) (1998 Moscow Agreement)
www.cawater-info.net/library/rus/moscow4.pdf (10 February 2010).
49 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers
adopted by the ILA at the 52nd Conference (Helsinki August 1966) in S
BogdanovicÂ International Law of Water Resources ± Contribution of
the International Law Association (1954±2000) (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional The Hague 2001 p 89).
50 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses (Helsinki 17 March 1992) 31 ILM (1992) 1312 (entered into
force 6 October 1996) (UNECE Water Convention). For status of
ratification see http://treaties.un.org (3 February 2010).
51 Article 18 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 23 May
1969) 1155 UNTS 331 provides that `a State is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it
has signed the treaty'.
52 A Tanzi Report of the UNECE Task Force on Legal and Adminis-
trative Aspects: The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Inter-
national Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNECE Geneva 2000)
http://www.unece.org/env/water/publications/documents/convention
total.pdf (10 March 2010); P Wouters and S Vinogradov `Analysing the
ECE Water Convention: What Lessons for the Regional Management of
Transboundary Water Resources?' in O S Stokke and é B Thommessen
(eds) Yearbook of International Co-Operation on Environment and
Development (Earthscan London 2003) pp 55±63; P Wouters `What
Lessons from Europe? A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Frame-
works That Govern Europe's Transboundary Waters' (2006) 36(4)
Environmental Law Reporter 10290±309.
53 B Libert `Water Management in Central Asia and the Activities of
UNECE' in M M Rahaman and O Varis (eds) Central Asian Waters:
Social, Economic, Environmental And Governance Puzzle (Water and
Development Publications Helsinki University of Technology Espoo
2008) p 37.
54 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (Espoo 25 February 1991) 30 ILM 800 (1991)
(entered into force 10 September 1997) (Espoo Convention).
55 UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents (Helsinki 17 March 1992) 31 ILM 1330 (1992) (entered into
force 19 April 2000).
56 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
(Aarhus 25 June 1998) 38 ILM 517 (1999) (entered into force 30 October
2001) (Aarhus Convention).
57 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (21 May 1997) 36 ILM 700 (1997) (not yet in
force) (UN Watercourses Convention). For status of ratification see
http://treaties.un.org (3 February 2010).
58 S C McCaffrey The Law of International Watercourses (2nd edn
Oxford University Press Oxford 2007).
59 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially
as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar 2 February 1971) 996 UNTS 245 (entered
into force 21 December 1975) (Ramsar Convention).
60 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro 5 June
1992) 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) (Convention
on Biodiversity).
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Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa (Convention on Desertification)61
which aims to combat desertification and mitigate the
effects of drought through effective actions at all
levels; and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Convention on Climate Change)62 that sets an
overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to
tackle climate change.
So there is a range of treaties applicable to the trans-
boundary waters of the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia.
Nevertheless, significant improvements are not evident.
While many political, economic, and social factors may
be responsible for this lack of an effective response,
the legal response could be strengthened by encoura-
ging compliance with existing commitments.
TREATY COMPLIANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS
Compliance `refers to a State's behaviour in terms of its
conformity with treaty commitments'.63 There are two
distinct approaches to ensuring compliance with inter-
national commitments, the traditional and the innova-
tive. A traditional legal response to securing compli-
ance calls for recourse to the law of state responsibility
and dispute settlement systems such as courts and
arbitration.64 An innovative approach considers that
punishing non-compliance and invoking responsibility
are often counter-productive. Instead, collective man-
agement or rather prevention of non-compliance has
gained wider support, especially in the international
environmental field.65 As with environmental damage,
one country's non-compliance with transboundary
water commitments usually harms all riparian coun-
tries and their environment, while reciprocal measures
by the other countries can only make the situation
worse. Besides, as Chayes and Chayes argue, `[o]nly
infrequently does a treaty violation fall into the
category of a wilful flouting legal obligation';66 com-
pliance is more often a function of the state's capacity
and commitment.67 A more cooperative approach to
securing compliance, including exchange of informa-
tion, financial and technological assistance and capa-
city building, is crucial, and the facilitation and
management of compliance with the provision of
transboundary water agreements deserves closer
attention.
In 2000, the UNECE/UNEP group of experts on public
participation and compliance68 prepared the UNECE
Geneva Strategy which sets out the main principles and
guidelines for establishing compliance review proce-
dures for any legal water-related instrument at inter-
national, regional, transboundary and catchment area
levels. The UNECE Geneva Strategy defines a compli-
ance system as `the set of treaty rules and procedures
aimed at assessing, regulating, and ensuring compli-
ance'69 and identifies three key elements for a success-
ful compliance arrangement including (1) baseline
provisions (`clear obligations capable of being ver-
ified'); (2) a compliance review procedure (ie exchange
of information, monitoring of standards or objectives);
and (3) an institutional mechanism (ideally, with a man-
date to monitor compliance).70 A treaty can itself con-
tribute to enhancing compliance if it establishes clear
rules (determinate and precise) and provides for a well-
established process, including an institution, to deal
with indeterminacy and ambiguities within the rules.71
However, it should be noted that, while necessary, the
complexity of water problems means that it is not easy
to reach precision in transboundary water agreements.72
The remainder of this article takes the main elements
of the UNECE Geneva Strategy ± baseline provisions,
compliance review and an institutional mechanism ± as
a framework for analysis. More specifically, the next
section identifies some substantive and procedural
rules which are embedded in existing treaties. This
review does not intend to be comprehensive but to
establish through examples whether the treaties' main
provisions are clear and capable of being verified.73
The section on compliance regimes examines whether
the treaties under consideration provide for a com-
pliance review procedure and assign institutions
devoted to monitoring compliance.
BASELINE PROVISIONS: KEY SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL RULES
Key rules of the sub-regional treaties and their
clarity
Under the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which validates the
Soviet water management scheme, the Parties shall
`respect [. . .] the existing pattern and principles of
68 UNECE Geneva Strategy (n 9) was prepared by a group of invited
experts under the overall guidance of Prof W Kakebeeke (Nether-
lands) with the assistance of Prof P Wouters (United Kingdom) and N
Bouman (Netherlands).
69 UNECE Geneva Strategy (n 9) p 39.
70 ibid pp 42±3.
71 See eg Beyerlin Ensuring Compliance (n 8).
72 T Franck The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford
University Press Oxford 1990) (discussing determinacy and the sophist
rule-idiot rule paradox).
73 For a broader analysis see S Vinogradov `Transboundary Water
Resources in the Former Soviet Union: Between Conflict and
Cooperation' (1996) 36 Nat Resources J 393±416; S Vinogradov and V
Langford `Managing Transboundary Water Resources in the Aral Sea
Basin: in Search of a Solution' (2001) 1 Int J Global Env'l Issues 345±62; S
Vinogradov `Background Paper on the Legal Basis for Transboundary
Water Cooperation' (2004) CWC project workshop on Legal Basis for
Transboundary Water Cooperation (in Russian); B Mukhamadiev
Evolution of a Treaty-based Law in the Aral Sea Basin: Relevance,
Application and Impact of International Water Law (unpublished LLM
thesis University of Dundee 2006).
61 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in
Africa (Paris 14 October 1994) 33 ILM 1328 (entered into force 26
December 1996) (Convention on Desertification).
62 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York 9 May
1992) 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (Convention on
Climate Change).
63 UNECE Geneva Strategy (n 9) p 39.
64 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) Can TS 1945 No 7
(entered into force 24 October 1945) art 2(3). See also United Nations
General Assembly Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts in `Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session' UN GAOR, Supp (No 10)
UN Doc A/56/10 (2001).
65 Note 8.
66 Chayes and Chayes (n 8) p 10.
67 ibid.
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water allocation, and be governed by current regula-
tions for water allocation from interstate sources'.74
Accordingly one of the principal substantive provi-
sions of the agreement is a reference rule; further
regulations are to be found in the relevant Soviet
directives75 and not in the treaty itself. Another
substantive obligation embedded in Article 3 of the
Almaty Agreement requires the parties `to refrain from
actions on their respective territories that might affect
interests of other contracting parties and cause harm
to them, lead to deviations from the agreed volumes of
water flow and pollution of water sources'. However,
the agreement provides little guidance to establishing
the threshold of harm incumbent upon states.
The 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement, which has a general
focus on protecting the environment, determines that
it is the CARs' `common objective' to ensure that water
flows in to the Aral Sea in order to preserve it as an
`object of nature'.76 Despite positive intentions, the
provisions of this agreement can be described as
mainly declaratory due to their focus on `common
objectives' without specifying precise obligations to
put these objectives in practice.
With respect to the Amudarya river basin, Article 6 of
the 1996 Chardjev Agreement stipulates that `the
Amudarya flow allocation (measured at the Kerki
gauging station) shall go in equal shares (50±50)'
between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as the parties
to the agreement. The parties also agreed `to direct to
the Aral Sea water flows proportionally to their shares,
carry out joint activities on land improvement, recon-
struction and operation of interstate collectors, addres-
sing technical issues of irrigation systems operation,
construction of water intake structures and drainage
systems'.77 Although the language of this agreement is
relatively precise, there seem to be technical difficul-
ties in taking necessary measurements of water flow.78
The 1998 Syrdarya Agreement, which is the result of a
difficult compromise between the contracting parties,
contains a number of ambitious and imprecise
substantive and procedural obligations. For instance,
while the language of Article 15 clearly endorses that
such matters as the construction of new water faci-
lities, shift from barter to financial arrangements, price
setting methodologies, dam safety, water conservation
issues and wastewater disposal are subject to the joint
consideration of the countries, the extent of such
consideration remains to be defined. Although intro-
ductory provisions call for the long-term regulation of
river flow and ecological security, the main text of the
treaty does not contain any clear obligations.79
According to the 1998 Environmental Cooperation
Agreement, the parties clearly committed to cooperate
and coordinate their actions in building new facilities in
frontier areas or in any areas that might have adverse
transboundary impact; transboundary resources con-
servation, rational use and pollution prevention;
undertaking joint environmental examination of pro-
jects that have or might have transboundary impact.80
Rules of the regional and global treaties and
their clarity
Under the 1998 Moscow Agreement, the parties agreed
in precise terms to avoid water management activities
that can adversely affect the environment, including
watercourses; to establish the principles of coopera-
tion regarding information exchange; to take appro-
priate measures in order to prevent surface and
ground water pollution and depletion; to take mea-
sures in order to reduce and eliminate the conse-
quences of natural and anthropogenic disasters; to
define the common principles of water resources use
and allocation; to estimate damages caused by water
use according to a unified methodology.81
The UNECE Water Convention establishes sound rules
for the parties' cooperation on environmental and
water resources, including obligations to prevent,
control and reduce transboundary impacts; to ensure
that transboundary waters are managed in a way that is
ecologically sound and rational and used in a reason-
able and equitable way; and to ensure conservation
and, where necessary, restoration of ecosystems.82 It
should be noted, however, that most provisions of the
convention are the obligations of `due-diligence' rather
than absolute obligations.83 In other words, the parties
shall `take all appropriate measures' to prevent, control
and reduce transboundary impact rather than bear the
strict obligations not to pollute that, by definition,
make compliance verification more difficult.
Finally, the UN Watercourses Convention stipulates
the substantive rules of customary international water
law such as the equitable and reasonable use84 and no
significant harm rule,85 coupled with procedural obli-
gations to cooperate,86 exchange information,87 and
notify.88 The UN Watercourses Convention, as a reflec-
tion of customary international water law, can also sup-
port implementation in Central Asia of sub-regional
water agreements, which do not comprehensively
define the rights and obligations of the parties, by
providing a framework for their interpretation.89
74 1992 Almaty Agreement (n 33) Preamble.
75 Note 35.
76 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement (n 36) art 1.
77 1996 Chardjev Agreement (n 38) art 6.
78 V Dukhovny A Sorokin and A Nikulin `Amudarya River Basin: Ways
of Probable Conflicts Prevention' http://afeid.montpellier.cemagref.fr/
Mpl2003/Conf/Dukhovny.pdf (20 April 2010).
79 See Findings of the CARs reports on the effectiveness of existing
basin agreements from the standpoint of national interests prepared
under the ADB Regional Technical Assistance 6163 `Improvement of
Shared Water Resources Management in Central Asia' (2005) http://
cawater-info.net/reta/documents/index_e.htm (7 February 2010).
80 1998 Environmental Cooperation Agreement (n 47) art 2.
81 1998 Moscow Agreement (n 48) art 2.
82 UNECE Water Convention (n 50) art 2.
83 UNECE Draft Guide to Implementing the Convention Meeting of
the Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes (5th Sess 10±12
November 2009 Geneva) ECE/MP.WAT/2009/L.2.
84 UN Watercourses Convention (n 57) arts 5±6.
85 ibid art 7.
86 ibid art 8.
87 ibid art 9.
88 ibid arts 12±16.
89 A Rieu-Clarke and F R Loures `Still Not in Force: Should States
Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?' (2009) 18(2) RECIEL
185±97; S Vinogradov, P Wouters and P Jones Transforming Potential
Conflict into Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water
Law (UNESCO Paris 2003).
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To sum up, the language of the sub-regional water
agreements can be generally characterised as ambi-
tious, declaratory and imprecise and so may hamper
both effective implementation of the parties' commit-
ments and verification of compliance. On the other
hand, obligations under the regional and global water-
related agreements are articulated more carefully and
comprehensively. However, some substantive obliga-
tions embedded in these treaties ± such as equitable
and reasonable use ± are complex and undetermined
in nature, whereas others are not specified in great
detail due to the framework nature of the instruments.
Moreover, the due diligence nature of certain obliga-
tions ± along with the corresponding concept of
`appropriateness' of the measures ± implies that a
significant degree of flexibility and relativity must be
applied to both contents and time frame of the
conduct of the parties.90 Accordingly, textually inde-
terminate standards such as equity, reasonableness,
appropriateness generally make it more difficult to
verify certain obligations and their fulfilment.
COMPLIANCE REGIME: COMPLIANCE REVIEW
PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISMS
Compliance mechanisms under the sub-regional
treaties
Compliance review procedure
The sub-regional agreements do not provide for a
compliance review procedure. Article 2 of the 1992
Almaty Agreement prescribes that the parties shall
ensure that the agreed regime will be `strictly ob-
served' but it remains unclear how non-compliance
will be detected and monitored. Some disjointed
attempts to monitor and facilitate compliance have
been undertaken under the 1998 Syrdarya Agreement.
Article 5 stipulates that parties shall take appropriate
measures to ensure compliance with the provisions of
the agreement through various forms of guarantees
such as credit lines, security deposits and others.
Article 7 of the 2001 Protocol adopted to implement
the 1998 Syrdarya Agreement91 states that, when nec-
essary, the parties shall ensure that access of observers
from other contracting parties to water management
facilities in the Syrdarya Water Basin operation area
will be secured during the growing period.
Institutional bodies
The 1992 Almaty Agreement established the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Cen-
tral Asia as a body responsible for water management
policy in the region92 and created two water basin
organisations at Amudarya and Syrdarya subordinate
to the ICWC.93 The 1993 Kzyl-Orda treaty placed the
ICWC under the newly-established Interstate Council
on the Aral Sea (ICAS).94 In 1997, the ICAS was trans-
formed into the International Fund for Saving the Aral
Sea (IFAS)95 and its status was stipulated in a separate
agreement.96 In 2008 the IFAS was granted observer
status in the United Nations General Assembly.97
Although a compliance control system is yet to be
established in the region, the activities of the ICWC
and its executive bodies appear to provide a basis on
which such a system can be built. The ICWC does not
have a mandate to monitor compliance but its practice
helps to establish a collective and transparent forum
for preventing and addressing controversies. A recent
development of regional and national information sys-
tems on water and environmental issues under the aegis
of the ICWC is one of the examples discussed below.
Article 5 of the 1992 Almaty Agreement provides that
`the Parties shall facilitate a wide information exchange
on scientific and technical progress in the field of water
management, complex use and protection of water
resources'. The heads of the CARs identified the
development of a regional information exchange
system as a priority area in the ASBPs.98 The Central
Asia Regional Water Information Base (CAREWIB) pro-
ject was developed in response to this, with the aims
of ensuring transparency and public awareness and
supporting decision making in the water sector.99 The
project is funded by the Swiss Agency for Develop-
ment Cooperation and implemented by the Scientific
Information Centre of the ICWC with the assistance of
UNECE and the UNEP/GRID-Arendal Office in Geneva,
in close cooperation with five national water manage-
ment organisations. The CAREWIB Information System
and the CAWater-Info portal (www.cawater-info.net)
are acknowledged as `an official system for keeping
records, collection, use and analysis of data, and
modelling of water and land resources in the Aral
Sea basin'.100
90 UNECE Draft Guide to Implementing the Convention (n 83).
91 Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and Government of the Republic
of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Naryn-
Syrdarya Cascade of Reservoirs in 2001 (Bishkek 20 May 2001) http://
cawater-info.net/library/rus/gov2.pdf (10 March 2010).
92 1992 Almaty Agreement (n 33) art 7.
93 ibid art 9.
94 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement (n 36) art 2.
95 The International Fund for saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) is an inter-
state organisation founded to develop and finance environmental and
scientific-practical projects and programmes aimed at environmental
improvement in areas affected by the Aral disaster as well as at solving
common socio-economic problems in the region. The IFAS has two
intergovernmental bodies: Interstate Commission for Water Coordi-
nation (ICWC) and Interstate Commission for Sustainable Develop-
ment (ICSD).
96 Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic
of Uzbekistan on the Status of IFAS and its Organisations (Ashgabad
9 April 1999) an unofficial English translation can be found at http://
www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/ifas_e_1.pdf (7 February 2010).
97 United Nations General Assembly `Resolution on Observer Status
for the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea in the General
Assembly' UN GAOR 63d Sess, Agenda item 156, UN Doc A/C 6/63/L13
(14 November 2008).
98 `Database and Management Information System for Water and
Environment' project was listed as a priority project in the ASBP-1. The
ASBP-2 included as one of the activities `Strengthening Material/
Technical and Legal Basis for Interstate Organisations, Development of
Regional Information System Designed to Manage Water Resources of
the Aral Sea Basin'.
99 For more information see http://www.cawater-info.net/about_e.
htm (10 March 2010).
100 CAREWIB 2008 Progress Report (CAREWIB Tashkent/Arendal/
Geneva 2009) http://cawater-info.net/library/eng/carewib/report_2008_
en.pdf (10 March 2010).
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The CAREWIB Information System helps to facilitate
compliance through building trust and transparency
between countries. ICWC members can request all
available data and information, including analytical
reports on water situations and forecasts, at any time.
Members enjoy full access to the information system
and are able to compare data from different riparian
countries. Water management organisations are sys-
tematically provided with analytical reports linking
hydro-meteorological data to water-related information
and analysis of river channel and basin balances.101
The system also promotes public awareness, since
access to most of the information, including analytical
reports (since the 1990s) and on-line information
about the BWO Amudarya and the BWO Syrdarya
(over the last decade) is available to the general public.
However, the public's potential role in facilitating and
monitoring compliance with obligations under the
sub-regional water agreements is undefined.
Clearly, the ICWC and its information system are not a
substitute for a compliance control system. The
CAREWIB project enables the CARs to exchange in-
formation as part of their primary procedural obliga-
tions and this information should be distinguished
from the requirements for compliance review and
monitoring. However, these activities are a step in the
right direction.
Compliance mechanisms under the regional and
global treaties
Compliance review procedure
The regional and global water-related conventions
contain some provisions to monitor and facilitate
compliance.
The UNECE Water Convention does not include ex-
plicit regional provisions regarding compliance review;
its framework nature generally implies that detailed
compliance control provisions are subject to basin-
specific agreements.102 Nonetheless, a number of the
articles can be used as a foundation for building a
cooperative framework to facilitate compliance, in-
cluding Article 10 on consultations, Article 11 on joint
monitoring and assessment, Article 12 on common
research and development, Article 13 on exchange of
information, Article 15 on mutual assistance, and
Article 16 on public information. Under the Espoo
Convention, implementation is reviewed through
periodic national reports submitted by parties com-
pleting a questionnaire.103 The Aarhus Convention
also requires regular reporting on the implementation
of the convention.104
At a global level, the UN Watercourses Convention,
the only global framework water instrument, does not
require compliance monitoring but does establish
various provisions to facilitate it. These include Article
8 on the general obligation to cooperate, Article 9 on
regular exchange of data and information, Articles 11±
19 on planned measures, and Article 24 on manage-
ment.
Four of the global environmental conventions men-
tioned above ± the Ramsar Convention, the Conven-
tion on Biodiversity, the Convention on Desertification
and the Convention on Climate Change ± enjoy a more
developed compliance review system. These conven-
tions provide for some form of general reporting and
monitoring to which all parties are subject (perfor-
mance review information), and non-compliance re-
sponse information, designed for those parties found
to be in non-compliance.
Performance review information is gathered through
national self-reporting in the Ramsar Convention,105
the Convention on Biodiversity,106 the Convention on
Desertification,107 and the Convention on Climate
Change.108 The Ramsar Convention includes a tem-
plate review format while the Conventions on Biodi-
versity, Desertification and Climate Change provide
detailed guidelines.109 Third party monitoring of the
national reporting system and third party verification
of national performance review can be respectively
undertaken under the Ramsar Convention and the
Convention on Climate Change.110 The Ramsar Con-
vention also provides for third party monitoring of
degraded wetlands as a non-compliance response.111
In 2007, the UNEP analysed compliance mechanisms
under selected multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) and found promising opportunities for links
between their compliance review requirements.112 The
101 ibid.
102 The Protocol on Water and Health to the UNECE Water Conven-
tion (London 17 June 1999) ECOSOC Doc MP WAT/AC1/1999/1 (24 March
1999) (entered into force 4 August 2005) takes another step forward
and includes several compliance review provisions. See UNECE and
WHO Regional Office For Europe `Report of the Meeting of the Parties
to the Protocol on Water and Health' (Meeting of the Parties 1st Sess
17±19 January 2007 Geneva) ECE/MP WH/2/Add3 EUR/06/5069385/1/
Add3. The protocol's compliance mechanism is not covered here in
detail as none of the CARs is a party to it.
103 Decision II/10 on the review of the Espoo Convention (n 54).
104 Aarhus Convention (n 56) art 10(2).
105 Ramsar Convention (n 59) art 6 established a Conference of the
Contracting Parties (COP) to review and promote its implementation.
COP 2 (1984) recommended that all parties submit reports to the
bureau six months before each ordinary COP. Ramsar Recommenda-
tions 2.1 and 4.3.
106 UN Convention on Biodiversity (n 60) art 26 calls upon parties to
`present to the Conference of the Parties, reports on measures which it
has taken for the implementation of the provisions of this Convention
and their effectiveness in meeting the objectives of this Convention'.
107 UN Convention on Desertification (n 61) art 26(1) states that
`each party shall communicate to the Conference of the Parties . . .
reports on the measures which it has taken for the implementation of
the Convention'. For more information see http://www.cbd.int/reports/
(10 March 2010).
108 There are different reporting obligations for Annex I and non-
Annex I Parties. UN Convention on Climate Change (n 62) art 7 pro-
vides for regular self-reporting by Annex I Parties. See http://unfccc.int/
national_reports/items/1408.php (10 March 2010).
109 For more information on the Convention on Biodiversity (n 60)
guidelines see http://www.cbd.int/reports/guidelines/; on the Conven-
tion on Desertification (n 61) see http://www.unccd.int/cop/cric5/
helpguides.php (10 March 2010); see also the Convention on Climate
Change (n 62) Decisions 22/CP.7 and 22/CP.8 and http://unfccc.int/
national_reports/items/1408.php (10 March 2010).
110 UN Convention on Climate Change (n 62) art 8 establishes a
third-party process for independent review of self-reported informa-
tion. The Convention on Climate Change Secretariat conducts on-site
verifications, mainly to obtain performance information.
111 Ramsar Convention (n 59) Annex 1 to Recommendation 4.7.
112 UNEP `Compliance Mechanisms under Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements' (UNEP Nairobi 2007) p 13.
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study also pointed out the importance of links
between subject-related global, regional and bilateral
MEAs but to date research efforts have not focused on
the water-related cluster of international agreements.
Institutional bodies
The Meeting of the Parties to the UNECE Water
Convention is the only institutional setting available
to raise matters about implementation of the conven-
tion. However, in 2009 the fifth Meeting of the Parties
decided to address concerns raised by a number of
countries that `Parties [. . .] do not have a clear and
permanent forum to resort to for advice and support
in the case of a specific potential or ongoing problem
of a procedural, legal and/or technical nature'113 and
authorised the Legal Board of the Convention to
explore options for the establishment of a mechanism
to support implementation and compliance for possi-
ble adoption at the sixth session of the Meeting of the
Parties in 2012.114 Although the UNECE Water Conven-
tion does not contain a specific provision that would
enable establishment of such a mechanism, the Meet-
ing of the Parties used its general power under Article
17 as a legal ground for this decision.115
The Espoo Convention envisages two specific institu-
tional mechanisms to facilitate implementation and
compliance; the implementation committee, and an
inquiry commission. Parties are invited to make sub-
missions to the implementation committee if they have
concerns about their own or another party's compli-
ance with obligations under the convention.116 An in-
quiry procedure allows the parties to make a submis-
sion to an inquiry commission to `advise on the likeli-
hood of significant adverse transboundary impact' if
they cannot reach agreement between themselves.117
Finally, the compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Con-
vention,118 another UNECE instrument, is frequently
referred to as unique. Kravchenko defines three signi-
ficant features of this mechanism: `(1) the ability of
nongovernmental organisations to nominate experts
for possible election to the Compliance Committee; (2)
the requirement that all Committee members be in-
dependent experts rather than representatives of state
Parties to the Convention; and (3) the right of any
member of the public and any NGO to file a
`` communication'' with the Committee alleging a Party's
noncompliance'.119
Globally, although the UN Watercourses Convention
does not envisage any institutional body reviewing
compliance, its provision on dispute settlement in-
cludes an innovative ± although still confrontational ±
mechanism of an impartial fact-finding commission to
resolve a dispute.120 The Ramsar Convention's imple-
mentation is institutionally supported by `a continuing
partnership between the Contracting Parties, the
Standing Committee, and the Convention Secretariat,
with the advice of the subsidiary expert body, the
Scientific and Technical Review Panel, and the support
of the International Organisation Partners'.121 The
Committee for the Review of the Implementation of
the Convention on Desertification assists the Con-
ference to the Parties in regularly reviewing imple-
mentation of the convention.122 Under the Convention
of Biodiversity, the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working
Group on Review of Implementation of the Conven-
tion is entitled to make recommendations to the
Conference of the Parties based on its examination
of the convention's implementation, including na-
tional biodiversity strategies and action plans.123 The
Convention on Climate Change established the Sub-
sidiary Body for Implementation to assist the Con-
ference of the Parties `in the assessment and review of
the effective implementation of the Convention'.124
To summarise, a review of the compliance provisions
embedded in sub-regional, regional, and global water-
related agreements shows that much remains to be
done if a sound compliance regime for transboundary
water resources management is to be developed.
Useful lessons can be learned from MEAs, especially
under the UNECE umbrella, but care should be taken
to avoid `blind' transplantation. As Beverlyn reminds
us, `every single MEA needs its own tailor-made
compliance control mechanism [. . . and] choosing
the `` right'' [one] depends on the type of obligations
contained in each particular treaty'.125
MAIN FINDINGS, THE NEED FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH ON COMPLIANCE AND THE
BROADER EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW IN CENTRAL ASIA
Effective management of Central Asian transboundary
waters is essential to securing regional peace and
achieving sustainable development. Beyond having the
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requisite laws, ensuring compliance with treaty com-
mitments can play a central role by promoting social
stability and legal certainty. This process involves
sound treaty-making to shape the contents of obliga-
tions as clearly and precisely as possible, and an effec-
tive institutional process to facilitate and monitor com-
pliance, and respond to non-compliance, if needed.
As the preceding analysis has shown, a sound com-
pliance system for transboundary water management
in Central Asia remains a work in progress although
improvement is gradually being made. At basin level,
efforts to strengthen the institutional capacity and
transparency of the ICWC through a broader informa-
tion exchange can be viewed as a nascent but valuable
step in building such a system. Promising develop-
ments towards establishing a facilitative body under
the UNECE Water Convention might effectively fill the
institutional gap at a regional level. Globally, the
compliance systems of MEAs can be valuable tools to
trace implementation of the water-related provisions
of these treaties. Finally, establishing links between
global, regional, and sub-regional water-related agree-
ments is vital.
A better understanding of compliance mechanisms is
the key to exploring options for formulating new basin
agreements and strengthening the institutional frame-
work of transboundary waters management in Central
Asia, as stressed by the heads of CARs in 2009.126
Developing enforceable treaty language and a robust
compliance regime would be a substantial investment
in enhancing compliance with these commitments in
the future.
Compliance matters in the regional management of
transboundary waters in Central Asia but well de-
signed rules and compliance provisions will not
provide an answer in themselves unless they are part
of a broader analysis of the role and workings of
international law. Several areas call for further research
to help enable a truly operative legal framework for
transboundary water cooperation in Central Asia.
First, as Downs, Rocke and Barsoom argue, coopera-
tion as measured by the existence of treaties and
compliance with international commitments may
sometimes be more `shallow' than it appears.127
Bernauer and Siegfried have reached the same con-
clusion in their analysis of the Syrdarya river case.
Researchers have found that implementation of the
1998 Syrdarya Agreement has been characterised by a
high level of compliance but low performance,
measured in terms of optimal performance (`the
outcome that should ideally be reached') and counter-
factual performance (`the outcome that would have
occurred in the absence of this policy').128 More
careful legal analysis is needed to confirm or disprove
these findings.
Secondly, focusing on compliance does not answer the
question of whether the law has a role to play in the
pre-commitment period. BrunneÂe points out that `[e]ven
a regime that does not arrive at a binding standard may
be effective if it develops a process of norm generation
that is perceived as legitimate by all those involved'.129
Regrettably, research on rule making processes and their
role in normative development is still in its infancy. To
take a Central Asian example, by and large, studies
undertaken in the region offer a formalistic and posi-
tivist analysis of law, which fails to include the process
of law-making, both within the basin and beyond. The
CARs have been working on strengthening the legal
and institutional framework of transboundary coop-
eration under two ASBPs since 1994, but to date there
has not been any rigorous examination of the process
of law-making in that context. Equally, the possible im-
pact of legal developments at the global and regional
levels, particularly the UN Watercourses Convention
and the UNECE Water Convention, on the process of
norm development in the region has not been fully
analysed. Such research might be valuable in guiding
the countries' efforts to elaborate and implement the
Third ASBP for 2011±2015.130
Thirdly, compliance does not clarify how law strikes a
balance between the status quo and the need for
change. Koskenniemi warned from a normative per-
spective that `focus on compliance silently assumes
that the political question ± what the objectives are ±
has already been resolved'.131 In Central Asia, for
example, the 1992 Almaty Agreement taken in isolation
fixes the Soviet-time status quo and requires `strict
observance' of then-established rules. However, the
need for change is justifiable when considered in a
wider landscape of the principle of equitable and
reasonable use, which adopts a flexible all-encompass-
ing approach to reconciling a broad range of existing
and new economic, social and environmental issues.132
Fourthly, a rigid concern with compliance alone appears
to leave no room for appreciation of the communica-
tive and constitutive role of international law. Thus,
Hathaway argues that human rights treaties might fulfil
both instrumental (`create binding law that is intended
to have particular effects') and expressive (`express the
position of those countries than join them') func-
tions.133 She also illuminates the constitutive effect of
the treaties in the sense that they change `perception
of what constitutes acceptable behaviour'.134 From an
expressive perspective, each of the signed agreements
in Central Asia can be considered as remarkable dem-
onstrations of willingness to embrace the international
community and actively deploy the rules and principles
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of international law to deal with the pressing water
problems. Taking into account the relatively short
history of the countries' international legal relations
and the increasing relevance of a `community' or erga
omnes obligations,135 there is hope that this appeal will
be treated more seriously. In turn, the constitutive value
of the agreements can be traced in terms of their
contribution to `shared conception of appropriate
behaviour'136 in building and maintaining transbound-
ary water cooperation.
Finally, the recent work of Howse and Teitel points out
that `[l]ooking at the aspirations of international law
through the lens of rule-compliance . . . obfuscates the
character of international legal normativity, tending to
ignore the centrality of interpretation to the genera-
tion of legal meaning, as well as the horizontal relation
between diverse norms and regimes (`` fragmenta-
tion'')'.137 Central Asia is an ideal site to illustrate the
importance of `performance-interpretation'138 in the
transboundary water management context on two
grounds. First, the unique nature of water and its
complex relationships with energy, food and environ-
mental security implies the existence of diverse norms
in the region that might conflict with each other.
Secondly, given that the rules of international water
law are typically complex in content and employ
`textually indeterminate standards' such as equity and
reasonableness, a `credible, institutionalised, and
legitimate interpreter of the rule's meaning in various
instances'139 is crucial for the region.
Taking these considerations into account and acknowl-
edging the positive insights of the UNECE Geneva
Strategy, this article raises the need for a new line of en-
quiry that will look more broadly at the role and work-
ings of international water law to gain a fuller under-
standing of how international law can direct the con-
duct of Central Asian states in resolving transboundary
water problems. International law must be considered
in a more analytical manner, as a vehicle that defines
means and mechanisms and enables and empowers
actors to interact over shared waters,140 with due regard
to its instrumental constitutive and expressive roles.141
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